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Abstract 
In this paper, I outline Hermeneutic Single Case Efficacy Design (HSCED), an interpretive 
approach to evaluating treatment causality in single therapy cases.  This approach uses a mixture 
of quantitative and qualitative methods to create a network of evidence that first identifies direct 
demonstrations of causal links between therapy process and outcome, and then evaluates 
plausible nontherapy explanations for apparent change in therapy.  I illustrate the method with 
data from a depressed client who presented with unresolved loss and anger issues. 
 
Keywords: research design, single case design, hermeneutic research, depression, process-
experiential psychotherapy 
 
 
 
Hermeneutic Single Case Efficacy Design  
 
 All Gaul, wrote Julius Caesar (51 BCE/1960), is divided into three parts.  Similarly, 
psychotherapy research can be organized into three main areas.  Unlike ancient Gaul, these 
domains are defined not by the rivers that separate them but rather by the scientific questions that 
motivate them, and by the language, customs and principles of the researchers who seek to 
answer these questions. 
 These three questions and the research territories they define are: (a) Has this client (or 
group of clients) actually changed? (outcome research; e.g., Strupp, Horowitz, & Lambert, 
1997); (b) Is psychotherapy generally responsible for change? (efficacy research; e.g., Haaga & 
Stiles, 2000); and (c) What specific factors (within therapy or outside it) are responsible for 
change? (change process research; e.g., Greenberg, 1986). 
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 In this paper I focus on the second question, the causal efficacy of psychotherapy.  
However, tackling this question requires answering both the first question (whether there is any 
actual change), and the last question (what processes mediate change).  Furthermore, I attempt to 
meet the challenge of answering these three questions for single therapy clients and 
nonbehavioral therapies, by proposing the Hermeneutic Single Case Efficacy Design (HSCED).  
 
The Need for a Critical-Interpretive Approach to Causal Research Design 
 The standard tool for addressing the efficacy of psychotherapy, the randomized clinical 
trials (RCT) design, is an extremely blunt instrument that suffers from a host of scientific 
difficulties (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Haaga & Stiles, 2000), especially poor statistical power, 
differential attrition, and poor generalizability due to restricted samples. 
 Causal emptiness.  Not the least of these difficulties are two related problems: First, 
RCTs rely on a stripped-down operational definition of causality (from J.S. Mill; see Cook & 
Campbell, 1979), in which inferring a causal relationship requires establishing: (a) temporal 
precedence (priorness); and (b) necessity & sufficiency (that cause and effect covary).  Thus, 
RCTs are Òcausally empty,Ó offering conditions under which inferences can be reasonably made, 
but providing no method for truly understanding the specific nature of the causal relationship.  
For this reason, Haynes and OÕBrien (2000) and others have argued that inferring a causal 
relation requires another condition, the provision of a plausible account ("logical mechanism") 
for the possible causal relation.  Unfortunately, RCTs provide no built-in method for establishing 
or identifying such plausible causal processes. 
 Poor generalizability to single cases.  Second, RCTs do not warrant causal inferences 
about single cases.   Even when a therapy has been shown to be responsible for change in 
general, for any specific client, factors other than therapy may actually have been the source of 
the observed or reported changes, or the clientÕs apparent change may have been illusory.  The 
existence of this inference gap argues for moving the locus of causal inference from the group to 
the single case, where each client's distinctive change process can be traced and understood. 
 Rescuing the N = 1 Design.  The traditionally-sanctioned alternative to group 
experimental design has been single-participant experimental design.  The logic and potential 
clinical utility of these designs is compelling (Sidman, 1960), and advocates have long argued 
for the applicability of these designs to nonbehavioral treatments (Peterson, 1968; Morgan & 
Morgan, 2001).  Nevertheless, these designs depend on behavioral assumptions about the change 
process, especially the situational specificity of behavior.  As a result, these designs have never 
caught on outside traditional behavior therapy, not even for cognitive-behavioral therapies. 
 In order to address the difficulties of applying single case design to nonbehavioral 
therapies, methodologists such as Kazdin (1981) and Hayes, Barlow and Nelson-Gray (1999) 
have proposed more flexible alternatives that stretch the guidelines of standard single case 
design, in particular, the clinical replication series.  These authors have proposed the following 
characteristics of single case research as useful for increasing internal validity (Kazdin, 1981): 
 1. Systematic, quantitative data (vs. anecdotal). 
 2. Multiple assessments of change over time. 
 3. Multiple cases (a form of multiple baseline design). 
 4. Change in previously chronic or stable problems. 
 5. Immediate or marked effects following the intervention. 
 
Sources of HSCED 
 
 
 Kazdin's (1981) general guidelines were one of the sources for HSCED.  Another source 
was Cook and Campbell's (1979) brief description of the modus operandi (i.e., one-group post-
only design), which they argued can be interpreted when there is rich contextual information and 
what they called Òsigned causesÓ (i.e., influences whose presence is evident in their effects).  
Mohr (1993) goes even further, arguing that the single case is the best situation for inferring and 
generalizing causal influences, which are obscured in group designs. 
 The final and most important source for HSCED was Bohart and Boyd's (1997) 
description of an interpretive approach to examining client qualitative accounts of change over 
therapy.  Starting from a client's assertion that she has changed and her claim that this is the 
result of therapy, Bohart and Boyd asked, "What would it take to make a convincing case that 
therapy caused a reported change?"  In general, the answer to this question takes the form of two 
types of information: (a) other evidence that the change occurred (corroboration); and (b) 
plausible ruling out of alternative possible sources of the change.   
 A rich case record of comprehensive information on therapy process and outcome (e.g., 
using multiple perspectives, sources and types of data) provides a useful starting point.  
However, critical reflection on the claim of therapy-caused change is also required, through 
maintaining awareness of one's personal expectations and theoretical presuppositions, while 
systematically searching for evidence that casts doubt on one's preferred account.  To do this, 
Bohart and Boyd (1997) proposed a set of plausibility criteria for evaluating client causal 
accounts, including evidence for grounding in the client's experience, deviation from 
expectations, elaboration, discrimination between positive and negative effects and processes, 
idiosyncraticness, and coherence. 
 
Essentials of Hermeneutic Single Case Design 
 In our society, experts systematically use practical reasoning systems to make various 
important judgments, including legal rulings and medical decisions.  HSCED is proposed as such 
a practical reasoning system, with the specific purpose of evaluating the causal role of therapy in 
bringing about outcome.  It builds on Bohart and Boyd's (1997) approach, but examines a larger 
set of alternative nontherapy explanations, makes greater use of quantitative outcome and weekly 
change data, and devotes more attention to systematically determining whether change has 
occurred. 
 Case Example.  To illustrate HSCED, I use a running case example: a depressed, 49-year 
old male European-American client whom I will refer to as Paul.  Paul's main presenting 
problems were financial worries, general negativity and cynicism, problems communicating with 
his son, and most importantly, unresolved issues from a rapid succession of the deaths in his 
family (mother, father, brother), 10 years previously.  He was diagnosed with Bipolar II disorder 
(major depressive episodes plus hypomania) and seen at the Center for the Study of Experiential 
Therapy for 39 sessions of Emotion-Focused Therapy (EFT, also known as Process-Experiential 
therapy), primarily focusing on issues of anger and loss.  He was seen by a second-year clinical 
psychology graduate student over the course of 16 months.  I did the research interviews. 
 
Rich Case Record 
 The first prerequisite for a hermeneutic single case efficacy design is a rich, 
comprehensive collection of information about a clientÕs therapy.  This includes background 
information, as well as data on therapy process and outcome, using multiple sources or measures.  
I have found the following data to be useful: 
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 (a) Basic facts about client and therapist, including demographic information, diagnoses, 
presenting problems, therapeutic approach or orientation (e.g., given above for Paul). 
 (b) Quantitative outcome measures.  Therapy outcome has both descriptive qualitative 
(how the client changed) and quantitative (how much the client changed) aspects.  For Paul, 
quantitative measures included standard self-report questionnaires such as the Symptom 
Checklist-90 (Derogatis, 1983), the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (Horowitz, Rosenberg, 
Baer, Ureo, & Villaseor, 1988), and the Simplified Personal Questionnaire (PQ; Elliott, 
Shapiro & Mack, 1999).  At a minimum, these measures should be given at the beginning and 
end of therapy, but it is also a good idea to give them periodically during therapy, every 8 to 10 
sessions.  Paul's quantitative outcome data are given in Table 1. 
 (c) Change Interview.  The Change Interview (Elliott, Slatick & Urman, 2006) is a semi-
structured interview that provides (a) qualitative outcome data, in the form of client descriptions 
of changes experienced over the course of therapy; and (b) client descriptions of their attributions 
for these changes, including helpful aspects of their therapy.  (Information on negative aspects of 
therapy and on medications is also collected.)  The Change Interview takes 30 - 45 minutes and 
is best carried out by a third party, every 8 - 10 sessions, at the end of therapy, and at follow-up. 
Paul listed six pre-to-post changes, including "More calm in the face of challenges." 
"Giving myself more credit for accomplishments." "Doing better financially." "Being a 
happier person." "Being more hopeful about my life." and "(I) don't feel young anymore" 
(=a negative change). Paul rated these changes as highly unlikely without therapy and 
described how therapy brought them about: "I don't think I would have looked at those 
[feelings] on my own....  I think the therapy actually in some way... gave me a process of 
grieving, maybe not all the stages of grief, but some." 
 (d) Weekly outcome measure.  A key element in HSCED is the administration of a 
weekly measure of the clientÕs main therapy-related problems or goals.  We used the Simplified 
Personal Questionnaire (Elliott, Shapiro & Mack, 1999), an individualized target complaint 
measure consisting of roughly ten 7-point distress rating scales.   
Paul's weekly mean PQ scores are given in Figure 1, which reveals an erratic pattern of 
numerous statistically reliable (> 1.0) week-to-week shifts in PQ scores. 
 (e) Helpful Aspects of Therapy (HAT) Form (Llewelyn, 1988) is a frequently-employed 
qualitative measure of client perceptions of significant therapy events.   This open-ended seven-
item questionnaire is administered to clients after therapy sessions.  In HSCED, HAT data are 
used to pinpoint significant therapeutic processes which may be associated with change on the 
weekly outcome measure or to corroborate change processes referred to in the Change Interview.   
In his HAT descriptions, Paul gave 12 significant events ratings of 8 ("Greatly helpful") 
or higher.  These descriptions provide a summary narrative of what the client considered 
at the time to be the most helpful events in his therapy.  
 (f) Records of therapy sessions.  Therapist process notes and videotapes of therapy 
sessions are collected in case they are needed to pinpoint, corroborate, or clarify issues or 
contradictions elsewhere in the data. 
For example, in order to make sense out of the largest shifts in Paul weekly PQ scores, I 
used his therapist's process notes. 
 
 
 
Direct Evidence: Clear Links between Therapy Process and Outcome 
 In HSCED, the starting point is direct evidence pointing to therapy as a major cause of 
client change.  In order to be confident about proceeding further with the analysis, it is best to 
have at least two separate pieces of evidence supporting the therapy-change link. 
 (1) Retrospective attribution.  First, the client may directly attribute a reported change to 
therapy. 
Clear support for the therapy efficacy hypothesis can be found in Paul's "likelihood-
without-therapy" ratings and his description of the role his therapy played in helping him 
feel more calm in the face of challenges. 
 (2) Process-outcome mapping.  The content of the client's posttherapy changes 
corresponds to specific events, aspects or processes within therapy. 
For example, five of Paul's 12 high-rated significant events (e.g., Session 12: "Feeling the 
hurt, fear, and sadness related to the loss of my family. It enabled me to realize that I can 
feel what might be under my anger.") refer to work on unresolved loss/grief issues 
regarding his family of origin, his major posttherapy change. 
 (3) Within-therapy process-outcome correlation.  In addition, theoretically central in-
therapy process variables (e.g., adherence to treatment principles) may be found to covary with 
week-to-week shifts in client problems.   
To examine this possibility for Paul's therapy, I correlated his therapist's postsession 
ratings of her use of Process-Experiential treatment principles, tasks and response modes 
with difference scores on the Personal Questionnaire (n=34 pairs of data points).  Only 
two of the 63 correlations were statistically significant (p < .05), less than would be 
expected by chance.  Therefore, at least on this basis, there was no evidence of a therapy-
change link. 
 (4) Early change in stable problems.  Therapeutic influence can be inferred when therapy 
coincides with change in long-standing or chronic client problems, contrasting with an explicit or 
implicit baseline. 
Paul's mean PQ scores (Table 1) do appear to show a reliable, 2-point drop from pre- to 
post-treatment.  Although we do not know how long Paul's problems had continued at 
roughly the same level, it is clear that some of them were of many years' standing.  
Furthermore, his two pretreatment PQ mean scores are consistent with each other (4.44 
and 4.11) and in the clinical range (i.e., well above the cut-off of 3).  His weekly PQs 
(Figure 1) show some instability, but this appears to be a consequence of three outlier 
sessions (4, 24, 39).  If these are ignored, the largest improvement occurs after session 1, 
moving the client into the nonclinical range. 
 (5) Event-shift sequences.  An important therapy event may immediately precede a stable 
shift in client problems, particularly if the nature of the therapy process and the change are 
logically related to one another (e.g., therapeutic exploration of an issue, followed the next week 
by change on that issue). 
Although Paul's PQ ratings contained many substantial shifts (Figure 1), the largest shifts 
appeared to reflect temporary blips associated with the three outlier sessions with no 
consistent relation to significant therapy events. 
Thus, there was supportive evidence linking change to therapy, on three out of five possible 
indicators. 
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Indirect Evidence: Competing Explanations for Apparent Client Change 
 HSCED also requires good-faith efforts to find nontherapy processes that could account 
for an observed or reported client change. The practical reasoning process involved in evaluating 
these alternatives is like detective work, with contradictory evidence sought and available 
evidence weighed carefully.  As a result, some nontherapy explanations may be ruled out 
entirely, while others may be found to partially or even completely explain the observed change.  
In addition, it is important to weigh both positive and negative evidence.  Discrepancies point to 
complexities or restrictions on the scope of change or the possible role of therapy. A further 
consideration is the degree of uncertainty considered tolerable.  The circumstances under which 
therapists and their clients operate preclude near certainty (p < .05), suggesting "reasonable 
assurance" or Òbeyond a reasonable doubtÓ (p < .2) as a more realistic and useful standard of 
proof. (The rest of this section is significantly abridged from the original version.) 
 
1. Trivial or Negative Change 
 The first four nontherapy explanations assume that apparent client change is illusory or 
artifactual.  First, the apparent changes may be trivial or negative. Trivial changes may described 
in such highly qualified or ambivalent terms as to cast doubt on their importance, or may involve 
changes in other people or life circumstances (one of Paul's changes was "doing better 
financially").  Similarly, changes on quantitative outcome measures may also fall into the trivial 
range (e.g., one point on the BDI).  Changes might also be negative, casting doubt on the overall 
effectiveness of the therapy.  For example, at an earlier assessment, Paul noted that he and his 
son were now fighting more than when he began therapy. Changes on quantitative outcome 
measures may also occur in the negative direction. 
 In order to assess trivial or negative change, it is useful to define intervals or threshold 
values that can be used to define change as nontrivial.  Jacobson and Truax (1991) proposed two 
criteria for evaluating change: (a) statistically reliable change and (b) movement past clinical 
caseness (i.e., clinical significance) cut-offs.  Table 1 includes these criteria for three key 
measures (SCL-90-R, IIP, PQ). 
Paul's outcome data indicate that from pre- to posttherapy he moved past the caseness 
threshold on 2 out of the 3 measures (SCL-90 and PQ) but that the amount of change was 
reliable on only 1 of these measures (PQ). 
Next, in order to assess for negative changes, the researcher can ask the client to describe any 
negative changes that might have occurred over the course of therapy.   
For example, at posttreatment, when Paul was asked about negative changes, he noted 
that he did not feel young anymore. 
Finally, clients can be asked to evaluate the importance of changes, perhaps using rating scales 
(cf. Kazdin (1999).  In the Change Interview, the client rates the importance of each change, 
using a 5-point scale.  In addition, the manner of the client's description can be examined for 
qualifiers and other forms of ambivalence. 
Thus, in his posttherapy Change Interview, Paul rated all of his positive changes as either 
"very" or "extremely" important; by contrast, he rated his one negative change, feeling 
old, as "slightly" important.  His descriptions of his changes were directly stated without 
qualifiers and even included occasional intensifiers ("I am in fact more calm than I've 
been in a long time"). 
 
2. Statistical Artifacts 
 
 
 Related to the possibility of trivial change is statistical error, including measurement 
error, regression to the mean, and experimentwise error. Measurement error involves random 
inconsistencies in quantitative measures. Jacobson and TruaxÕs (1991) formula provides a 
confidence interval for defining a minimum Reliable Change Index (RCI) value for client 
change, at either the traditional 95% level or the 80% level proposed here.  Client change which 
is less than the minimum RCI value is judged to reflect measurement error.  Table 1 contains 
RCI minimum values for three common outcome measures: SCL-90, IIP, and PQ.   
Paul's pre-to-post change on two of the three outcome measures was less than the 
prescribed values, although his change on the PQ is statistically reliable.  However, the 
frequent drastic shifts in Paul's weekly PQ scores raised issues about temporal instability 
(consistent with his atypical bipolar diagnosis) and suggested that it would be a good idea 
to use the median of his first three and last three PQ scores (Table 1 values in 
parentheses).  The difference between these pre- and posttherapy median PQ scores 
greatly exceeded the minimum RCI value of 1.00. 
 Regression to the mean occurs when measurements with less than perfect reliability are 
selected on the basis of their extreme values (Cook & Campbell, 1979). If regression to the mean 
is operating, then repeating the measurement prior to beginning therapy is likely to reveal a sharp 
drop; if this occurs, the second measurement can be used as the pretest.  
For example, one possible explanation for the numerous sharp spikes in Figure 1 is 
measurement error followed by regression to the mean. However, Paul's two pretreatment 
PQ scores were fairly stable (both above 4 or "moderately distressed"), indicating that 
they were representative of his usual responses; thus, the substantial changes observed in 
Paul's PQ scores are probably not a function of regression to the mean.   
 Experimentwise error is a function of carrying out multiple significance tests on change 
measures.  When examining several measures for evidence of change, some apparently reliable 
differences may occur due to chance alone.  For example, when looking at change on three 
measures at p < .2, the probability of one or more measures out of three showing reliable change 
by chance was .49!  The solution here was to require reliable change on two out of three 
measures, corresponding to a probability of p < .10).  Requiring replication of reliable change 
across different outcome measures allows designating a client as demonstrating Global Reliable 
Change. 
Using these criteria, Paul showed reliable change at posttreatment on only one out of the 
three measures, thus failing to demonstrate Global Reliable Change.  However, he did 
satisfy this standard at 6-month follow-up (see last two columns in Table 1), and his 
posttherapy PQ change exceeded the p < .05 significance level.  Thus, it would be most 
accurate to say that Paul showed reliable but limited change at follow-up but not 
immediately posttherapy. 
 
3. Relational Artifacts 
 Apparent client improvement may also reflect interpersonal dynamics between client and 
therapist or researcher.  The classic relational artifact is the legendary (but impossible to 
attribute) Òhello-goodbyeÓ effect, in which the client enters therapy emphasizing distress in order 
to impress the research staff to accept him/her.  Then, at the end of therapy, the client emphasizes 
positive functioning, either to express gratitude to the therapist and research staff or to justify 
ending therapy.  (I suspect that the use of fixed time limits in most therapy research works to 
strengthen this effect.). 
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 In order to determine the role of these interpersonal artifacts, client narrative descriptions 
are invaluable.  These accounts are probably most credible when they emerge spontaneously in 
therapy sessions or research interviews; however, researchers may prefer to obtain these 
accounts systematically via questionnaire or interview.  Because interviews are a highly reactive 
form of data collection, client quantitative accounts of the effects of therapy need to be read very 
carefully for nuance and style, using Bohart and Boyd's (1997) plausibility criteria, especially 
elaboration and discrimination. The validity of client accounts is also enhanced if a researcher 
(rather than the therapist) interviews the client, and if the researcher conducts an extended, in-
depth interview in which he or she encourages thoughtful self-reflection and openness on the part 
of the client. 
PaulÕs Change Interview data contained substantial detail and at least some negative 
descriptions.  Nevertheless, his manner and choice of language suggested that he may 
have deferred to me as an apparently successful authority figure, suggesting that he may 
have held back negative views of his therapy to avoid offending me.  This would explain 
the discrepancy between his mixed quantitative outcome results and his highly positive 
Change Interview descriptions.  Because I was aware of the possibility of his trying to 
please me, I tried to communicate the attitude that any critical comments would be 
especially appreciated because they would help improve the therapy.  
 
4. Expectancy Artifacts 
 Cultural or personal expectations about therapy or wishful thinking may also give rise to 
apparent client change.  That is, clients may convince themselves and others that since they have 
been through therapy they must therefore have changed.  Post-therapy accounts are likely to be 
particularly vulnerable to this retrospective expectancy bias.  Longitudinal measurement of 
change is no guarantee against clients expecting themselves to do better at the end of therapy and 
therefore giving themselves the benefit of the doubt when recalling, integrating, and rating subtle 
or ambiguous phenomena such as mood symptoms, relationships, or self-evaluations.  
 Examining the language clients use to describe their experience can be useful here, 
because expectation-driven descriptions are likely to rely on shared cultural scripts about the 
effects of therapy by using standard or clichd phrases (e.g., "someone to talk to"). Client 
accounts of changes that conform entirely to cultural stereotypes are less credible than those that 
contain idiosyncratic content or word choice (cf. Bohart & Boyd, 1997). 
For example, Paul's descriptions generally contained a mixture of stock elements (the 
idea that releasing blocked feelings is therapeutic), but often qualified in idiosyncratic 
ways (e.g., typifying this release as a gradual process occurring over the course of a 
year).  Some of Paul's descriptions of his change process did have an intellectualized, 
self-persuasive quality, for example (italics added):  "I think I could see the progress, and 
that can only help build self-esteem and self-confidence.  So as that goes up, maybe 
proportionately, maybe the anxiety goes down."  Faced with this self-speculative account, 
I asked Paul to check the accuracy of his description, which enabled him to elaborate a 
more experientially-based account of extended, painful grieving for deceased family 
members.  In addition, on four of his six changes, Paul rated himself as "somewhat 
surprised." 
 
5. Self-correction Processes 
 
 
 The remaining nontherapy explanations all assume that change has occurred, but that 
factors other than therapy are responsible.  First, client internally-generated maturational 
processes or self-help efforts may be responsible for observed changes.  For example, the client 
may have entered therapy in a temporary state of distress that has reverted to normal functioning 
via the self-limiting nature of temporary crises or the personÕs native problem-solving processes. 
In these instances, client self-healing activities operate prior to or independently of therapy. A 
general strategy for evaluating the final four nontherapy explanations is to ask the client:   
When Paul was asked what brought about his changes, the first thing he said was "Being 
honest with myself, and being open to change, to trying new things."  By itself, this 
statement would qualify as a report of self-generated change.  However, without 
prompting, Paul then went on to indicate that this self-generated change process was 
related to therapy: "Since the therapy, I think I've had a lot more courage to really try new 
things. It's been exciting."  In addition, Paul rated three of his six changes as "very 
unlikely without therapy". 
Therapist process notes provide an efficient source of information about client self-help efforts, 
and can be used in conjunction with shifts in PQ scores. 
Paul showed a large drop on his PQ after session 1; in her process notes, Paul's therapist 
noted that Paul had recently made the effort to speak to a friend with similar loss issues, 
and that this conversion had made him feel less alone. 
Self-correction in particular can also be evaluated by comparing client change to a temporal or 
expectational baseline.  A temporal baseline requires measuring the duration or stability of the 
client's main problems or diagnoses.  In lieu of repeated pretreatment measurement, clinicians 
generally measure the baseline of a client's problem retrospectively, by asking the client how 
long he or she has had the problem.   
A review of session tapes and therapist process notes made it clear that two of PaulÕs 
main problems -- anger/cynicism and unresolved grief -- were difficulties of at least 10 
years standing, while his financial problems and anxiety about his son were of relatively 
recent vintage (i.e., on the order of months).  The duration of his central problems make 
self-correction an unlikely explanation for his change on the PQ. Overall, there is clear 
support for Self-Correction as a partial influence on Paul's changes, but the evidence 
indicates that it is unlikely that Self-Correction was primarily responsible, without 
themselves reflecting the influence of therapy. 
 
6. Extra-therapy  Events 
 Extra-therapy life events include changes in relationships such as crises, deaths, divorces, 
initiation of new relationships, marriages, births.  In addition, clients may change jobs, get fired 
from jobs, get promoted or take on new work responsibilities, change recreational activities, and 
so on.  Extra-therapy events may be discrete or they may involve chronic situations such as an 
abusive relationship or the consequences of substance abuse or other problematic behavior.  
They may also include changes in health status due to physical injuries or illnesses or medical 
treatments, where these do not directly impinge on psychological functioning.  Further, extra-
therapy events can contribute both positively and negatively to therapy outcome, and have the 
potential to obscure the benefits of a successful therapy as well as to make an unsuccessful 
therapy appear to have been effective.  Finally, it is important to consider the bidirectional 
influence of therapy and life events on one another. 
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 The most obvious method for evaluating the causal influence of extra-therapy events is to 
ask the client.  In the Change Interview, clients are asked what they think brought about changes.  
If a client does not volunteer extra-therapy events, the interviewer inquires about them.  In 
addition, therapist process notes and session recordings are useful sources of information about 
extra-therapy events, because clients almost always provide in-session narratives about important 
positive or negative extra-therapy events.  A useful method for locating important extra-therapy 
events is to look at weeks associated with reliable shifts in weekly change measures such as the 
PQ. 
Extra-therapy events are the major nontherapy counter-explanation in Paul's treatment.  
When asked, Paul spontaneously described: "Support from my family.... Reading...  I 
have to say my exercise, that's important... New activities.  Mainly the jobs."  His PQ 
data reveal one large, clinically significant drop at session 2, and three "spikes," at 
sessions 4, 24 and 39.  Consistent with the drop before session 2, the therapist's process 
notes describe the client as feeling better, linking this to positive developments in his job 
and family, as well as a discussion with a friend with similar problems.  On the other 
hand, extra-therapy events had a clear negative influence in the weeks prior to sessions 4 
and 25.   
 
7. Psychobiological Causes 
 The next possibility is that credible improvement is present, but is due primarily to 
unidirectional psychophysiological or hormonal processes, including psychotropic medications 
or herbal remedies; the hormonal effects of recovery or stabilization following a major medical 
illness (e.g., stroke) or after childbirth; or seasonal and endogenously-driven mood cycles. This 
is a particular problem for psychotherapy research when clients begin or change their 
medications within a month of beginning psychotherapy, or during therapy.  The most obvious 
approach to evaluating psychobiological factors is to keep track of medications, including 
changes and dose adjustments.  It is also important to ask about herbal remedies.  (The Change 
Interview includes questions about both of these.) 
Paul had been stable on his anti-anxiety medication since well before the beginning of 
therapy, and had been taking SSRIs for almost as long, with a minor increase in his latest 
SSRI one month before the end of therapy. 
In addition, client interview data and therapist process notes provide useful sources of 
information about medication and the effects of other medical and biological processes. 
For example, at his 6-month follow-up interview, Paul disclosed that he had suffered 
from a major, life-threatening illness during the intervening time, and had experienced a 
greater sense of focus and appreciation for what was important as a result.  
 
8. Reactive Effects of Research 
 The final nontherapy explanation involves the reactive effects of taking part in research. 
These include helpful research activities  (e.g., pre-therapy assessmentz), interactions with the 
research staff, and enhanced sense of altruism from helping others by taking part in research.  On 
the other hand, research activities can have negative effects on clients, especially if they are 
particularly evocative or time-consuming. Teasing out the reactive effects of research on client 
outcome can be difficult, but qualitative interviewing about the effects of research can be useful.  
Another possibility is to use nonrecruited clients and unobtrusive data collection.  Spontaneous 
comments during sessions, summarized in therapist process notes, are also worth noting. 
 
 
For example, in session 4, Paul expressed concerns at not being able to be totally open in 
therapy, because of his concerns about the recording equipment.  (Several times during 
therapy, he referred to "All you assholes watching this.")  In addition, he sometimes 
wrote snide comments on his postsession questionnaire. 
 
Summary and Conclusions of HSCED Analysis of Paul's Therapy 
 Reviewing the results of applying HSCED to Paul's treatment, there was clear or 
moderate support for 3 out of 5 types of direct evidence: retrospective attribution, immediate 
perception, and change in stable problems.  Since the standard is replication across two or more 
types of direct evidence, this was more than adequate. 
 In terms of negative evidence, the standard is that no nontherapy explanation can by itself 
or in combination with other nontherapy explanations fully explain the client's change, although 
nontherapy explanations can and usually do play some role in accounting for change.  For Paul, 
there was clear or moderate support against a primary role for all nontherapy explanations, 
except experimentwise error.  The analysis indicates that the change reported on the PQ was 
unlikely to be due to chance, but identifies Paul's change as narrowly limited to his presenting 
problems (indicated by lack of change on the SCL-90 and IIP).  Self-help, extra-therapy events 
are also important supporting influences but not to the exclusion of therapy. 
 Beyond this, however, what have we learned about psychotherapy from this intensive 
analysis?  First, most simplistically, the analysis supports the claim that Process-
Experiential/Emotion-Focused therapy can be effective with clients like Paul, i.e., clients with 
major depressive disorder plus hypomania ("Bipolar II"), particularly when they present with 
issues of anger and unresolved grief.  Second, although effective, there was still room for 
improvement, especially with regard to a broader range of problems and areas of functioning.  
Third, the analysis makes it clear that therapy exerted its helpful effects within a context of other, 
supporting change processes, especially extra-therapy events and self-help efforts.   
 
Specific Change Processes 
 Finally, in the process of sorting out the role of therapy in Paul's change process, I was 
able to use his descriptions of what he found helpful in his therapy, including post-session 
descriptions of significant events, but more importantly his descriptions from his post-therapy 
Change Interview.  These accounts provided enough detail to allow me to construct the 
following model of his change process, providing a plausible account of the chain of events from 
cause (therapy) to effect (outcome) (Haynes & OÕBrien, 2000):  
First, in therapy, (a) Paul credited his therapist for "bring[ing] me back to certain areas 
that she thought I needed to work on, which I might have overlooked"; resulting in (b) "a 
consistent process of sharing my problems, my frustrations, my heartbreaks"; which (c) 
"gave me a process of grieving, maybe not all the stages of grief, but some."  This 
grieving process was one of being "able to gradually release it over a year." 
 
As a result of this, he was able to build on in-therapy work through his own efforts: (d) 
He said, "Then you see a tangible result.  And even before [my nephew's] funeral I went 
out to my family's graves and I was able to cry."  (e) After this, Paul said, he "start[ed] 
maybe for the first time in a long time, to recognize my progress"; and (f) "that can only 
help build self-esteem and self-confidence." (g) Finally, Paul implied that this extended 
grieving/release process had begun to undo his earlier problematic functioning ("I kept a 
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lot of things bottled up [before], and I think that just adds pressure, adds to the anger, 
adds to the anxiety"); leading to (h) reduced anger and anxiety about hurting other people 
with his anger ("feeling more calm, and not blowing challenges out of proportion"). 
 
Issues in Hermeneutic Single Case Efficacy Design 
 In order to carry out an HSCED study, one needs to (a) find an interesting and agreeable 
client; (b) collect appropriate measures; (c) apply them to construct a rich case record; (d) 
analyze the information to see if change occurred; (e) establish if direct evidence linking therapy 
to client change is present and replicated; (f) carefully analyze the evidence for each of the eight 
nontherapy explanations; (g) interpret and weigh the various sets of sometimes conflicting 
information; and (h) come to an overall conclusion about the likelihood that therapy was a key 
influence on client change. 
 HSCED is a new development and clearly needs further testing and elaboration.  My 
team and I have applied HSCED to Paul and other clients (e.g., Elliott, Partyka et al., 2009).  
What we have learned so far can be summarized as follows: 
 First, the ÓDid the client improve?Ó question has turned out to be more complex than we 
first thought.  Our clients often present us with a mixed picture, showing improvement on some 
measures and not others, or telling us that they had made great strides when the quantitative data 
contradicted this (see Elliott, Partyka et al., 2009).  It is important not to underestimate the 
complexity of this initial step. 
 Second, this experience has convinced us that more work is needed on how to integrate 
contradictory information.  We need better strategies for determining where the Òweight of the 
evidenceÓ lies (see Schneider, 1999). 
 Third, we find ourselves in need of additional creative strategies for evaluating 
nontherapy explanations.  For example, to bolster the self-reflective/critical process of examining 
nontherapy processes, Bohart (2000) has proposed a form of HSCED that relies on an 
adjudication process involving separate teams of researchers arguing for and against therapy as a 
primary influence on client change, with final determination made by a Òresearch jury.Ó  
However, a less involved process might simply make use of two researchers, one (perhaps the 
therapist) supporting therapy as an important influence, the other playing ÒdevilÕs advocateÓ by 
trying to support alternative explanations.  The researchers might present both sides, leaving the 
final decision to a scientific review process (cf. Fishman, 1999).  We are currently testing a form 
of adjudicated HSCED (Elliott, Partyka et al., 2009). 
 Fourth, in comparing HSCED to traditional RCT design, we have found that HSCED 
requires fewer resources but is in some ways more difficult and demanding in that it requires 
researchers to address complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions ignored in traditional 
designs.  These complexities are present in all therapy research, but RCTs are able to ignore 
them by simplifying their data collection and analysis.  In my experience, every group design is 
made up of individual clients whose change process is as rich and contradictory as the clients we 
have studied.  The fact that these complexities are invisible in RCTs is yet another reason to 
distrust them and to continue working toward viable alternatives which do justice to each clientÕs 
uniqueness, while still allowing us to determine whether (a) the client has changed, (b) whether 
these changes have anything to do with our work as therapists, and (c) what specific processes in 
therapy and in the client's life are responsible for these changes. 
 
 
 Beyond these relatively delimited research applications, HSCED raises broader issues, 
including the appropriate grounds for causal inference in applied settings, external validity, and 
the nature of causality in psychotherapy. 
 Causal inference in the absence of RCTs. Skilled practitioners in a variety of settings 
continually apply useful but implicit practical reasoning strategies to make causal judgments 
about single events, ranging from medical illnesses to lawsuits to acts of terrorism (see Schn, 
1983).  For example, forensic and medical practice are both fundamentally systems for 
developing and testing causal inferences in naturalistic situations. HSCED uses a set of 
procedures to assess possible alternative explanations for client change.  The researcher uses a 
combination of informant (client and therapist) and observer data collection methods, both 
qualitative and quantitative.  These methods confront the researcher with multiple possible 
indicators of which they must make sense, typically by looking for points of convergence and 
interpreting points of contradiction. 
 External validity with single cases.  Logically, what can be demonstrated by a single case 
such as the one I have presented is the possibility that this kind of therapy (EFT, specifically, 
using primarily empathic exploration and empty chair work over the course of about 40 sessions) 
can be effective with this kind of client (male, middle-aged, European-American, 
intellectualizing, psychologically reactant) with this kind of problem (e.g., recurrent depression 
with hypomanic episodes, unresolved multiple losses, current family conflicts).  Predicting how 
effective a similar therapy would be with a similar client would require a program of systematic 
replication (Sidman, 1960), and, ultimately, a summary of a collection of similar cases, 
analogous to precedents established by a body of case law (Fishman, 1999). 
 Nature of causation in psychotherapy.  Another broad issue concerns the kinds of causal 
processes that are relevant to understanding change in psychotherapy.  The following three 
propositions seem most consistent with how clients change over the course of therapy: 
 First, change in psychotherapy involves opportunity causes (bringing about change by 
opening up possibilities to the client), rather than coercive causes (forcing or requiring change).  
Psychotherapy appears to work by offering clients occasions to engage in new or neglected ways 
of thinking, feeling and acting and by helping clients remove obstacles to desired behaviors or 
experiences. 
 Second, if opportunity causes are the rule in therapy, then, by definition, change in 
therapy involves multiple contributing causes (ÒweakÓ or ÒsoftÓ causation) rather than sole 
causes (ÒstrongÓ or sufficient causation).  After all, opportunities are not commands and can 
always be rejected or simply ignored.  Therapist responses in therapy sessions, and even client-
therapist interactions in sessions, can provide at best only a partial explanation of client change.  
Other factors must be assumed to play important roles as well, including extra-therapy life 
events, biological processes, and especially client internal self-help processes.  A complete 
interpretation of the change process probably requires weaving together the different therapy and 
nontherapy strands into a narrative such as the one I presented at the end of the analysis section 
of this chapter. 
 Finally, the development of explanations of therapy outcome is a fundamentally 
interpretive process, involving a Òdouble hermeneuticÓ (Rennie, 1999) of client (engaged in a 
process of self-interpretation) and researcher (engaged in a process of interpreting the self-
interpreter).  The double hermeneutic suggests that the client is a really a co-investigator, who 
acts always as an active self-interpreter and self-changer.  As researchers, we follow along 
behind, performing a second, belated act of interpretation, carefully sifting through the multitude 
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of sometimes contradictory signs and indicators provided by the client.  Although we are 
sometimes weighed down by methodology, nevertheless, it is our greatest desire to understand 
how our clients change, in order to become more effective in helping them do so. 
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Table 1 
Outcome Data for Client PE-04 (Paul) 
 
Measure: Case-
ness 
RC Min 
(p < .2) 
Pre Post 6-month 
follow-
up 
SCL-90-R 
GSI 
.93 .51 1.17 .80 .47 
Inventory of 
Interpersonal 
Problems-26 
1.50 .57 1.69 1.62 .96 
Personal 
Questionnaire 
3.0 1.00
a
 4.44 
(4.11)
b 
2.44 
(2.78)
b 
2.22 
Note.  Caseness:  cut-off for determining whether client is clinically distressed; RC Min: 
minimum value required for reliable change at p < .2; "+" =  Reliable improvement from 
pretherapy.  Sources for values given: Barkham et al. (1996; Inventory of Interpersonal 
Problems); Ogles, Lambert & Sawyer (1995; SCL-90-R GSI); Wagner & Elliott (2001) 
a
Corrected from original version 
b
Using median of three successive weekly scores to smooth instability of scores. 
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Looking Back: Commentary on ÒHermeneutic Single Case Efficacy DesignÓ (Elliott, 2002) 
Robert Elliott 
University of Strathclyde 
 
When I was a 26-year-old graduate student at UCLA, my advisor invited me to come 
along to the 1976 annual conference of the Society for Psychotherapy Research, at the Hotel del 
Coronado in San Diego, California, a couple of hoursÕ drive south from Los Angeles.  It was my 
first scientific conference, and I hadnÕt been organized enough to arrange for hotel 
accommodations before I left, so one of the two nights I ended up sleeping in my car.  At the 
conference dinner, I heard Aaron Beck, the founder of cognitive therapy, give his presidential 
talk.  I met Laura Rice, Les Greenberg, Len Horowitz, Bill Pinsof, to name just a few of the 
people who would later become friends.  The conference changed my life; I was electrified by 
the possibilities of the field of psychotherapy research.  At some point during the conference I 
decided in my youthful enthusiasm that I wanted someday to become president of SPR. 
More than two decades later, I got my wish.  Now I would have to think of something 
impressive and interesting to talk about!  Fortunately, SPR gives its newly-elected General Vice 
Presidents about two years to come up with something.  I had some time to mull over the subject 
of my talk.  But what?   
I had spent most of my career as a research methodologist, developing one new method 
after another.  Why not do it again?  That sounded like a good idea.  IÕd been interested in single 
case design since graduate school and early in my career had advocated greater use of systematic 
case studies (Elliott, 1983).  More recently, IÕd had a long talk with Art Bohart at the 1997 North 
American SPR meeting in Tucson, Arizona, about some ideas he had for an interpretive 
alternative to randomized clinical trials (Bohart & Boyd, 1997).  What if we could develop a 
method for using qualitative data from client and therapist in order to help us decide whether 
therapy had caused the client to change?  What would that look like? Art was developing a list of 
criteria for doing just that.  (See Bohart, Berry & Wicks, 2011, for the latest iteration of his list.) 
Together with my team of clinical psychology graduate students at the University of 
Toledo, I started playing around with some of the data weÕd been generating in our research 
clinic.  The method we began to develop, with ArtÕs inspiration, was both interpretive and 
focused on establishing causality between what happened in therapy (process) and what the 
client got out of it (outcome).  ÒHermeneuticÓ is a fancy word for ÒinterpretiveÓ, while ÒefficacyÓ 
is one of many euphemisms for Òcausal.Ó  We seemed to have walked into an oxymoron:  
hermeneutics was supposed to be the opposite of causal research.  Instead of beating around the 
bush, I decided to embrace the apparent contradiction, and called the method ÒHermeneutic 
Single Case Efficacy Design,Ó or HSCED for short.  (Pronounced ÒH-sked,Ó following Rhonda 
GoldmanÕs helpful suggestion.) 
The first HSCED presentations were given in at the Chicago SPR meeting in 2000.  After 
that, the method was further refined, and my SPR presidential talk began to take shape, around 
an interesting case, a depressed research client for whom IÕd acted as researcher.  Having heard 
me in Chicago, Kurt Schneider asked me for a short book chapter (Elliott, 2001) in which I 
presented the rationale and main procedures of the new method. Eventually, I gave my 
presidential talk, at the 2001 SPR conference in Montevideo, Uruguay and after that set about 
writing up the journal article version (Elliott 2002).   
Looking back, I am very pleased with how the journal article version came out.  There is 
very little I would change about it today.  The essentials of the basic HSCED method are clearly 
Hermeneutic Single Case Efficacy Design, p. 18 
 
laid out in the paper, including guiding principles, design elements, types of linking evidence, list 
of eight alternative explanations, plus the research procedures for bringing all this off.  Of 
course, the method has continued to evolve in important ways over the past 10 years.   
 At this point, the only thing I would want to clarify is the somewhat muddy distinction 
made between ÒdirectÓ and ÒindirectÓ evidence, which is now more cogently described as the 
basis for the affirmative and skeptic cases, as part of the legalistic approach used in HSCED 
today.  
 
HSCED 2.0: The Development of Adjudicated HSCED 
 In the ten years since Elliott (2002) was published, the next step in the development of 
the HSCED method was adding a quasi-judicial component.  Because my father was an attorney, 
I had a long-standing interest in the application of legal principles and practices in research.  In 
this I was once again strongly influenced by Art Bohart, who had also been experimenting with 
quasi-judicial case study methods (Bohart & Humphries, 2000).   
 The result was the case of ÒGeorge,Ó a client with bridge phobia and panic, who received 
23 sessions of emotion-focused therapy (Elliott et al., 2009).  We used separate teams of 
researchers to assemble an agreed-upon set of evidence (the rich case record), along with 
affirmative and skeptic cases, rebuttals and closing arguments.  The rich case record and the sets 
of arguments were presented to three judges, well-known psychotherapy researchers representing 
cognitive-behavioral (Louis Castonguay), psychodynamic (Stan Messer) and humanistic-
experiential (Jeanne Watson) approaches.  The judges were asked to rule on (a) whether the 
client had changed, and (b) whether therapy was responsible for the clientÕs changes.  In 
addition, they were asked to describe their understanding of how change had come about. This 
elaborated HSCED method was cumbersome, but seemed warranted, first, because humanistic 
therapies are often assumed to be ineffective with anxiety disorders, and, second, because the 
quantitative and qualitative outcome data contradicted each another.  In the end, the three judges 
unanimously agreed that the client had changed and that therapy was responsible for his changes.  
In their supporting opinion statements, the judges each explained the change process in terms of 
their particular theoretical orientation.   
 As an additional feature (originally introduced because of timing), the 6- and 18-month 
follow-up data were withheld from the judges.  This provided an additional procedure for 
validating client change, which has since been regularly incorporated in HSCED studies. 
 In 2006, I moved from the Ohio to Scotland, where it quickly became clear the 
systematic case studies such HSCED were highly appropriate as masters-level research projects 
for the counseling and counseling psychology students I was now teaching.  Using data from the 
new research clinic at the University of Strathclyde, students began carrying out adjudicated 
HSCED studies of clients with social anxiety.  Three of these new studies have now been 
published, looking at the use of person-centered and emotion-focused therapies with this client 
population (McLeod & Elliott, 2012; McLeod, Elliott & Rodgers, 2012; Stephen, Elliott & 
McLeod, 2011). 
 This recent wave of HSCED research has led to further refinement and standardization of 
procedures for constructing rich case record and opposing arguments.  In particular, my students 
and I have experimented with the procedure for judging cases. We have developed a format for 
judges to use, including more precise questions on which judges are asked to rule, including the 
use of 6-point rating scales. We have also moved toward mixed sets of student and professional-
level judges. 
 
 
Although these developments improve the rigor and appeal of the method, I think that the 
original version (Elliott, 2002) still has value and provides a useful starting point for 
understanding the method. 
 
Impact of HSCED (Elliott, 2002) on Psychotherapy Research 
According the Web of Science (accessed on 8 June 2013), the journal article version of this talk 
(Elliott, 2002) has been cited 28 times; the publisherÕs website lists 61 citations.  The most 
common citing journal is Psychotherapy Research (14 citations), but many of the citations are 
from Counseling and Psychotherapy Research (12) or Person-Centered and Experiential 
Psychotherapies (6), journals not indexed in the Web of Science. This locates the focal impact of 
Elliott (2002) in the readership of these journals, that is, psychotherapy and counseling 
researchers in the UK and the USA, many of a humanistic-experiential theoretical persuasion. 
 A recent book on psychotherapy case study research (McLeod, 2010) features a chapter 
in HSCED as part of Òthe new case studyÓ movement in psychotherapy research. Systematic case 
study research, including HSCED, appears to have emerged as an important part of the current 
zeitgeist in psychotherapy research. 
 
Elliott (2002) and the Future of Psychotherapy Research 
 What about the future?  Human beings are not very good at predicting the future, because 
their predictions are generally guided either by wishful thinking or simplistic linear 
extrapolations from the present (Sterling, 2003).   
 Generalizing from single cases.  I am going to skip the simple linear extrapolation and go 
directly to the wishful thinking:  What do I hope for the future development of case study 
research in general, and HSCED in particular?  First, dating back at least to Bromley (1986) and 
Fishman (1999), the goal of contemporary case study research has been to create generalizable, 
clinically relevant knowledge that practitioners can use, by analogy to the concept of legal 
precedent in case law.  Since conducting large RCTs is out of reach for practitioners, the goal has 
been to empower them to contribute to the development of scientific knowledge via case 
research on their own or each otherÕs practice.  This is the long-term vision of the new case study 
movement.  However, to do this we will need to develop clear practices and procedures that will 
provide a basis for generalizing from existing published cases to new cases. 
 Identifying specific causal processes.  Right now, my money is on the specification of 
key moderator and mediator variables as a basis for generalizing from single case research.  As 
HSCED has developed over the past 10 years, it has become ever clearer that we need to go 
beyond general causal inference to the specific causal factors responsible for change in therapy.  
Increasingly, an essential feature of HSCED studies has become an explicit enumeration and 
justification of (a) mediators, the particular within-therapy processes that helped bring about 
client change, such as the therapeutic relationship or particular techniques, and (b) moderators, 
the specific contextual or pretherapy factors that helped the client make use of therapy, such as 
client social environment and ability to make use of what is offered in therapy.  In spite of its 
ubiquity, standard psychiatric diagnosis seems unlikely to be helpful here. 
 HSCED as Change Process Research.  In the past, the concepts of mediating and 
moderating variables have been used almost exclusively to group design research.  However, as I 
see it, there is great potential in applying these same ideas to single case research.  At the same 
time, the increasing emphasis on mediating and moderating factors is moving HSCED into the 
Hermeneutic Single Case Efficacy Design, p. 20 
 
realm of change process research, thus connecting it to the other great traditions in 
psychotherapy research (Elliott, 2010) 
 
Conclusion 
 In Elliott (2002), I cited MohrÕs (1999) idea that the optimal place to identify causal 
processes in human behavior is not in randomized group designs.  As appealing as they are, 
group causal designs blur the complex and diverse underlying causal processes, making them 
harder rather than easier to see.  Instead, Mohr argued, the royal road to understanding what 
causes programs to succeed, or clients to improve, is via in-depth qualitative understanding of 
the single case.  It is only by thoroughly understanding the individual that we can attain essential 
and generalizable knowledge about how people in general change.  Like ÒhermeneuticÓ and 
Òefficacy,Ó this is another oxymoron, the seeming contradiction that underlies the emergence of 
the New Case Study movement in psychotherapy research.  I am pleased that my SPR 
presidential talk, published as Elliott (2002), continues to play an important role in this still-
developing approach to psychotherapy research.  
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